




Australia
India
Joint
Technology
Impact
Assessment
Project

Briefing Note #2

Project Outcomes

*Australian National University
InKlude Labs
Arizona State University
Social Cyber Institute
Southern Cross University
Blended Learning International
RMIT University*

2025

*This project is funded by the Australia India
Cyber and Critical Technologies Partnership*

Project Overview

On 5 November 2024, Australia's Foreign Minister Senator Penny Wong announced in a joint press statement with the Indian Minister for External Affairs S Jaishankar that the Australian National University (ANU) had been awarded a grant to lead a project under the Australia India Cyber and Critical Technologies Partnership (AICCTP). Co-leader of the grant is InKlude Labs in Bengaluru. Researchers involved in the work also come from the Takshashila Institution, Social Cyber Institute, Arizona State University, Southern Cross University, Blended Learning International and RMIT University.

This project sought to promote rigorous ethical approaches to technology assessments of critical emerging technologies that impact peace and stability. It sought to strengthen consensus among key stakeholders in Australia and India regarding the importance of a process for technology assessments that can be undertaken jointly with each other. Such activity would represent an important diplomatic innovation in bilateral relations for addressing the challenges posed by rapid technological advances and the evolving geopolitical landscape.

The project aimed to create a self-organising community of practice (CoP) inclusive of both countries, ensuring its sustainability after the project's conclusion and potentially extending its influence on a wider multilateral scale. To support these goals, the project created an open-access curriculum for the professional education of government officials and stakeholders responsible for assessing critical and emerging technologies. Delivered over a year, the project was led by a multi-disciplinary team of senior researchers and professional educators from Australia and India who have expertise in technology, industry, economics, geopolitics, and public policy. This initiative was funded by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) as part of the Australia India Cyber and Critical Technologies Partnership (AICCTP). For more information, videos and written product, see <https://www.socialcyber.co/australia-india-tech-assessments>.

We published two Briefing Notes and two Research Papers between the start of the project and 25 September 2025, supported by eight public webinars, two private workshops and a series of stakeholder interviews. On the basis of those activities, we compiled a syllabus for a Professional Development course to help equip policymakers, analysts, and strategic advisors with knowledge and practical skills to manage Technology Impact Assessments (TIAs) in support of peace and stability.

Briefing Notes

- [Briefing note #1](#) provides an overview of the project (November 2024)
- Briefing Note #2, this document, provide a summary of the project on its completion (October 2025)

Main findings: Research Paper 1

- Discussion Paper: [‘Technology Impact Assessment for Peace and Stability: A Comparative Study on Australia and India’](#) June 2025

Since 2020, Australia and India have committed to coordinating policy on critical technologies to promote peace and stability. This is part of a deepening political, economic and strategic relationship across many sectors. One of the policy tools for managing technology policy in both countries has been that of technology impact assessment (TIA), a process that has been in existence internationally for more than five decades. TIA is the systematic analysis of the impacts arising from the use of technologies. This includes both specialist assessment of their technical performance characteristics and cost-benefit considerations as well as consultations across diverse stakeholder groups (such as government, industry, academia, and society) to determine broader social, political, legal and economic consequences.

In both Australia and India, there is only a modest record of impact assessments for critical emerging technologies affecting peace and stability. We could not easily identify cases of best practice by either country. This paper makes a case for greater use of such assessments and the adoption of more credible and more comprehensive evidence-based approaches. It has had to draw on global experience to arrive at lessons for Australia and India.

The peace and stability agenda of most countries is, in essence, the diplomatic face of national security policy – the practices of shaping, implementing or contesting international regimes or cooperative measures to enhance national security. This includes issues related to deterrence as well as common or cooperative security, such as conflict prevention, protection of global critical infrastructure, arms control, or plurilateral regimes for technology development. These issues may not lend themselves to the sort of expansive public consultation that most specialists have regarded as an essential element of modern TIA. Voters in Australia and India have not traditionally placed a high priority on the diplomacy of peace or cooperative security, where single technologies have been the main focus. In countries where TIA is most developed, its focus has been on domestic policy concerns such as health or the environment.

The global practice of TIA in support of peace and stability has emerged in various forms, with varying degrees of secrecy or transparency, and at different stages of technology development and deployment. Moreover, there are many distinctions between TIA focused on stability (e.g., as in the stability of cyberspace or shared space situational awareness) and those intended for the protection of peace (e.g., diplomatic aspects of deterrence or maintaining a geostrategic balance of technological power).

In addition, in the global practice of TIA, we see a tension between analyses that start with a technology-first approach and those that set out to address specific policy problems, with clearer implications for systemic risks and opportunities. The bias toward technology-first approaches has been aggravated by the increasing political attention paid to TIA as a tool of geopolitical competition between the US and its allies on the one hand, and China on the other

hand, for leadership in R&D for dual-use technologies. The critical technologies agenda of Australia and, to a lesser extent in India's case, is more focused on variants of a 'tech war' than on the positive contributions that new technologies might make to cooperative security, that is, the peace and stability agenda. This situation has arisen in large part due to escalating operations in cyberspace and the escalating confrontation between the US and China.

One of the notable recent examples of TIA of a class of technologies affecting peace and stability has been the US National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI 2021). Over several years, this commission addressed issues of deterrence, peacetime technological competition with other countries, and the domestic foundations of US technological power. The Commission also analysed important military applications of AI, highlighting the grey areas and overlaps between a peace and stability agenda and issues of military power.

When we look at the practices of Australia and India, we find some excellent examples of TIA in support of peace and stability. We see this in the Australian planning for the prevention of nuclear accidents, which have become linked to the critical technologies agenda by the emerging influences of AI and cyber security on long established nuclear safety processes. In India, the ongoing TIA for specific AI applications, such as facial recognition technologies, will likely have important policy implications for peace and stability. For the most part, TIA for peace and stability has not consistently been a high priority for either country. In TIA for peace and stability in Australia, parliamentary committees have been the leading actors while in India, security and technology agencies have been in the lead.

The broad framing we have observed from Australia and India on critical emerging technologies does not offer a clear direction as to methodologies for conducting TIA for specific technologies or their strategic impacts. Currently, there are no best practices for TIA, which explicates a defined approach and methodology articulated by scholars or officials. This ambiguity stems from the fact that TIA can be used for many different purposes while focusing on the concerns of different groups of stakeholders. Since 2022, a number of stakeholders (leading intergovernmental organisations, think tanks and specialists) have called for increased attention to TIA and more disciplined approaches, particularly emphasising effective stakeholder engagement, and consistently ethical, democratic and transparent processes.

It may not be useful to set rigid guidelines for how a country might undertake TIA with a focus on critical technologies for peace and stability. However, there are several benchmarks that we can use: an appropriate balance in focus between a very broad class of technology (such as AI) and specific sub-fields where the impacts are distinct from those of other sub-fields (facial recognition compared with chatbots); the scope and granularity of the technology being assessed; the depth and detail of specialist input; the recognition of the significant role of non-technical social, political, legal, and economic impacts; the breadth and depth of stakeholder input; the comprehensiveness of the analysis, which should include international and alternative perspectives; the timeliness of the assessment; and the relevance of the findings to diplomacy aimed at promoting peace and stability. An important cluster of non-technical specialisations that must be well represented in TIA for peace and stability includes international relations, international law, and strategic studies. There is also a need for clarity about the ethical frameworks to be applied.

Most countries now face choices about where in the machinery of governance the most effective forms of TIA for peace and stability can be seated: in the national parliament, in government agencies or statutory authorities, and/or in specially convened task forces or commissions of inquiry representing diverse specialists and stakeholders. The minimum requirement would appear to be a recognised institutional centre of gravity for TIA in each country and a set of basic principles.

TIA increasingly has a national security focus and as a consequence is mostly expert driven and not conducted in the public domain. Many critical and emerging technologies are general purpose and have dual use applications. There are benefits from conducting these assessments in public, with wider stakeholder consultation, and across the technology life cycle.

Both Australia and India would benefit from a clearer commitment to regularised TIA of critical technologies for peace and stability. This would involve organisational reform and commitment of more resources, which could be justified by reinstating peace and stability to the policy status it enjoyed in the 1990s and the first decade of this century. A drift to more confrontational relationships in international affairs in the past decade should point to the need for more investment in TIA related to maintaining peace and stability, alongside the more readily accepted increases in investment in TIA for hard military capability or domestic security.

Main findings: Research Paper 2

- Discussion Paper: [‘Technology Impact Assessment for Peace and Stability: Diplomatic Opportunities for Australia and India’](#)

Australia and India have accumulated considerable good will and substantial experience of collaboration in science and technology that might now be turned more consistently to shared interests in peace and stability. Technology impact assessment (TIA) has been an essential diplomatic tool supporting international peace and stability since the late 1960s and 1970s, mostly through arms control treaties and international organisations specifically requiring such activities. Since that time, the number of cross-border or joint TIAs in various fields has markedly increased.

Throughout 1999, Russia and the United States (US), along with other countries, collaborated closely on assessments of control systems to protect against a nuclear command and control crisis from the Y2K challenge. By 2002, the United Nations (UN) was convening groups of experts to analyse the security implications of information and communications technologies. By 2022, the COVID pandemic had driven international TIA in the health sector very firmly into the realm of international stability as states struggled to shore up the economic and social foundations of economic security.

All the while, international standard-setting based on shared and debated technology assessments affecting security was being undertaken in a variety of multilateral regimes, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). In the private sector, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) had become one of the most influential international actors in building bridges across geopolitical divides in global TIA practices, albeit on a limited scale and more in exchange and discussion than in advanced joint TIAs. By 2025, joint TIAs for peace and stability of one kind or another were being supported by diverse and numerous communities of practice.

The concept of joint technology impact assessment (TIA) had little purchase in the bilateral relationship between Australia and India until 2020. In July 2025, the two countries announced their first-ever inter-governmental joint assessment process in a field directly impacting peace and stability, namely undersea surveillance using several critical technologies.

Our research, published in an earlier research paper in this project, found that to the present day, neither country has institutionalised in its domestic policies a consistent framework for public-facing, open-access TIAs on issues influencing peace and stability. Both Australia and India have

institutionalised the TIA process in public health and environmental policy, with varying degrees of public consultation and parliamentary oversight. However, neither country applies these processes of public consultation to matters of peace and stability on a consistent basis. The twin foundations of advanced TIA at the domestic level – public consultation and parliamentary oversight – are often less robust when applied to international issues.

Our previous paper compared the settings in each country for TIA of critical technologies affecting peace and stability. In the current paper, we analyse the arguments for why the two governments should establish a standing mechanism for bilateral TIA of critical technologies for that purpose. The mechanism would not need to be too formal or too structured, but it would need to recognise the key criteria for advanced TIA identified in both papers. It could be based on the concept of a community of practice for specialists, officials, and other stakeholders committed to and trained in TIA. There should be a governmental office responsible for guiding methodologies of technology assessment. This would have to be part of a more deliberate institutional redesign in bilateral security and science diplomacy, by both governments, to make joint TIA a much higher priority.

We identify four factors critical for success in future joint TIA between Australia and India: (1) political commitment; (2) institutional capacity; (3) resource allocation; and (4) cultural sensitivity. Geopolitical concerns will also come into play in shaping the choices for a particular TIA to be undertaken. Important technologies and areas of scientific research may remain off limits to bilateral activity because of such sensitivities. However, as existing joint programs demonstrate, there is a vast array of sub-fields that will not face such sensitivity. We mention three possible examples: (1) digital identity; (2) biotech for pathogen detection; and (3) maritime situational awareness.

At the same time, we suggest that efforts by Australia and India to promote TIA for peace and stability would reap greater diplomatic gains if they were framed as part of a campaign for a multilateral regime of TIA that is based on open communities of practice. These cross-border communities would involve trusted governments, community and business stakeholders, and specialists. Initiatives to develop a community of practice for TIA in peace and stability could be supplemented through the delivery of professional education in this field relying in part on a syllabus developed by this project. No country has the resources to independently undertake advanced TIA for all of the applications of critical and emerging technologies.

For Australia and India, this effort would focus on a political geography of shared interest, such as developing countries of the Indian Ocean region, Southeast Asia and potentially the South Pacific. This undertaking would ideally be based on a limited set of critical technologies of most value to those countries, such as artificial intelligence (AI) applications, for the purposes of economic development that is an essential underpinning regional security.

The idea of ‘TIA of critical technologies’ might usefully become more prominent in the foreign policy and science diplomacy of Australia and India. OECD researchers in 2023 called out the value of a multinational hub for TA; and UN agencies in 2024 and 2025 made similar calls. In June 2025, the Sixth European Technology Assessment Conference (ETAC6) helped set the stage for this: it was dedicated to the theme of ‘Technology Assessment Goes Global’ and was the first global convening of Technology Assessment (TA) practitioners and scholars.

Our proposition is to shift the locus of advanced TIA from Europe and the US, where it has been firmly established through four decades, to a gradually expanding number of geographies outside the club of advanced economies. Now that this globalisation of TIA has been launched, Australia and India have a unique opportunity to work collaboratively to shape this process while registering gains for their own national and bilateral interests in peace and stability.

Webinars

- Webinar 1: 7 February 2025 ‘From Benefits to Bans: The Role and Influence of Technology Impact Assessments’
Speakers: Professor Roger Clarke, ANU; Professor Katina Michael, Arizona State University; Bharath Reddy, Takshashila Institution
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 2: 21 February 2025 ‘Perspectives on Technology Impact Assessments: From Geopolitics to Quantum Sensing’
Speakers: Pranay Kothasthane (Takshashila Institution); Greg Austin, (Social Cyber Institute)
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 3: 7 March 2025 ‘Technology Impact Assessments: Case Studies from Australia and India’
Speakers: Dr Austin Wyatt (RAND Australia); Dr Ravi Srinivas (NALSAR University of Law) ([more info](#))
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 4: 11 April 2025 ‘From iCET to TRUST: India/US Strategic Partnership for Peace and Stability’
Speakers: Geetanjali Kamat, Digantara; Greg Austin, Social Cyber Institute
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 5: 23 April 2025: ‘Critiques of Global Settings for Technology Impact Assessment Affecting Peace and Stability’
Speakers: Dr Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Australian Strategic Policy Institute; Dr Jürgen Altmann, TU Dortmund University
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 6: 23 May 2025: ‘Convergences between TIA in India and Australia for Peace and Stability’
Speakers: Jayantika Rao, analyst at the Delhi Policy Group; Ujjwal Kumar, Associate Director & Deputy Head CUTS-CCIER, Jaipur.
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 7: 27 June 2025: ‘Futures for the Quad Regarding Technology Trends, Peace and Stability’
Speaker: Mike Nelson, Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
 - [Video](#)
- Webinar 8: 24 July 2025: ‘Technology Policy: National Capacities and International Opportunities’
Speakers: Nitin Pai, co-founder of the Takshashila Institution; Professor Simon Goldstein, University of Hong Kong
 - [Video](#)

Special Interview Series with Katina Michael

Eighteen interviews were conducted between 19 May 2025 and 15 July 2025, with dozens more scheduled. Interviews explored technology impact assessment from a variety of disciplines and representative stakeholders. Of the 18 initial interviews, 5 included female interviewees. The majority of interviews were conducted with academics, independent consultants, third sector organisations, and think tanks representing defence and security. The job role of interviewees varied markedly, and included: current and former heads and deans of schools and faculties, policy researchers, higher research candidates, directors of not-for-profits, academic researchers, standards representatives and independent consultants. Interviewees were predominantly from Australia and India, but also drew individuals from Bangladesh, Indonesia, Germany, Singapore, Uganda, USA. The length of the interviews varied from 37 minutes to 85 minutes. The interviews were used to validate results garnered from an initial scoping exercise, subsequent webinars and workshops. The Human Research Ethics application for the study at large, inclusive of semi-structured interviews, was approved by the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee (Protocol 2024/1245).

The key areas addressed in the interviews related to a multi-/ inter-/ trans-disciplinary perspective on technology impact assessment based on the interviewee's background, experience and current role. The historical significance of technology assessments was described in the context of peace and stability. Interviewees were asked to define technology impact assessment, and provide relevant case examples. Interviewees were also asked if there were specific criteria and/or methodological approaches that should be considered when conducting a TIA. Critical and emerging technologies of a national interest were discussed, as was their evolution, technological convergence, dual-use applications, and technology lifecycles. The intent of TIAs, their respective elements, main stakeholders, and primary and secondary audiences was considered, as well as the effectiveness of current methods of government consultation and stakeholder engagement. Brainstorming on opportunities to conduct TIA jointly between stakeholders in one or more nations, and what that might look like, and how it might be executed was covered. Hindrances and obstacles toward bilateral / multilateral TIA were identified, as were related shortcomings, limitations and potential misuse.

\#	Interviewee	Main Affiliation	Title of Interview	Country	Stakeholder Type
1	Jürgen Altmann	Technische Universität Dortmund	Military Technology Assessment	Germany	Academic
2	Stephen Wilson	Lockstep Consulting	Data Protection and Digital Identity	Australia	Independent Consultant
3	Greg Austin	Social Cyber Institute	Cyber Policy Research and International Security Policy	Australia	Academic
4	Abubakar Moki	Uganda Network of Business (UNB)	Policy Development and Capacity Building through TIA	Uganda	NfP
5	Krishna Ravi Srinivas	NALSAR University of Law	Socio-Economic Impact Assessment	India	Academic

6	Ujjwal Kumar	CUTS International	Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS International)	India	NGO
7	Jannatul Moreom	Blending Learning International	Global Development in Bangladesh	Bangladesh	Academic
8	Robert Cook-Deegan	CSPO	The Role and Form of Technology Assessment	USA	Academic
9	Jaya Pillai	AI and Strategic Policy Foresight Consultant	Dimensions of Technology Impact Assessment	Singapore	Independent Consultant
10	Ravi Nayyar	University of Sydney	Regulatory Impact Assessment: A Case on Cybersecurity	Australia	Academic
11	Helaine Leggat	ICTLC Australia	Technology Impact Assessment: Operationalization	Australia	Independent Consultant
12	Reena Dayal	QETCI	The Quantum Ecosystem in India and Technology Impact Assessment	India	NfP
13	Andrew Goldsmith	Flinders University	Technology's Impact on the Policing Sector	Australia	Academic
14	Shefali Malhotra	Technology, Health & Human Rights	Digital Health Technology Assessment	India	Advocacy
15	Glenn Withers	Social Cyber Institute	Technology Impact Assessment: An Economist's Perspective	Australia	Academic
16	Danil Kerimi	WIPO	Technology Impact Assessment: An International Consultant's Perspective	USA	Independent Consultant
17	Lyria Bennett Moses	UNSW Sydney	Technology Assessments: A Lawyer's Perspective	Australia	Academic
18	Gatra Priyandita	ASPI	The Role of Technology Impact Assessment: A Political Instrument	Australia	Think Tank

Towards a Community of Practice

A tangible long-term ambition for the project has been to create a bilateral self-organising community of practice (CoP). Prospective stakeholders for the CoP included the experts and participants who took part in the workshops and webinars, and others whose roles have been previously published on public records via government agency web sites or the media.

The project integrated professional educational elements to strengthen bilateral collaboration between India and Australia in addressing critical emerging technologies. This will involve two quite distinct elements. First, eight hybrid webinars with international experts, that were designed to support the research objectives of the project, and which would also serve as important opportunities to disseminate knowledge to a wide group of interested stakeholders in Australia and India, as well as other countries. Separately, after all other activities of the project are completed, the team developed an open-access short course syllabus for joint TIA aimed at mid-level and senior representatives of government, business and the community.

Our education-related activities aim to equip government officials, policymakers, and stakeholders from Australia, India, and beyond with insights into the ethical, social, and geopolitical dimensions of emerging technologies. These activities seek to offer insights on how to harmonise regulatory frameworks and diplomatic strategies for maintaining peace and stability.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution by speakers in our webinars and workshops, and by participants in our stakeholder interviews. We also recognise the role of more than 100 participants in our webinars and the workshop devoted to the topic of this paper. Pranav Kotasthane played an important role as advisor on the paper and the project. The team would also like to thank James Chapman and Zara Yap for administrative and technical support during the project; and Pranav Rao Bappanad for graphic design support through <https://www.artstation.com/onedudecomics>.

Project Team

The co-chief investigator was **Emeritus Professor Glenn Withers AO**, who is a leading researcher in science and technology cost-benefit and regulation economics. He also researches population, skills and education, and is known for the development of the Australian immigration points system. He is a co-founder of the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University (ANU), Universities Australia and the Australia New Zealand School of Government and. He has served as Head of the Economic Planning Advisory Council in Australia. The Crawford School of Public Policy at the ANU has access to a wide network in Australia and overseas of specialists in the economic and social aspects of national technology development and assessment. We will also leverage the Global Development Learning Network (affiliated with the World Bank), operating in 80 countries, and chaired by Professor Withers.

Karthik Bappanad, the co-chief investigator with Professor Withers, is a technologist with a keen interest in public policy, and currently a consultant at InKlude Labs, based in Bengaluru India. Karthik was earlier heading CySeck, Karnataka state's Centre of Excellence in Cyber Security, prior to which he was heading Security Engineering at ReBIT. He likes to work in the intersection of technology, policy and ethics. InKlude Labs is a research and consulting organisation, focusing on areas that has an impact on policy and governance. InKlude Labs has

considerable experience, including under an existing AICCTP Round 3 grant, in delivering advanced research and related public policy activities along with conducting educational outreach on public policy.

Katina Michael (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.S. degree in information technology from the University of Technology Sydney in 1996, the Doctor of Philosophy degree from the University of Wollongong Australia in 2003, and the Master of Transnational Crime Prevention degree from the University of Wollongong in 2009. She researches the social, legal, and ethical implications of emerging technologies. Between 2018-2024, she held a joint professorial appointment with the School for the Future of Innovation in Society and the School of Computing and Augmented Intelligence, Arizona State University, where she was the Director of the Society Policy Engineering Collective. She has been funded by national research councils in Australia, the USA, the UAE and Canada. She was also an Honorary Professor with the School of Business, University of Wollongong, where she was previously the Associate Dean International of the Faculty of Engineering and Information Sciences. She is the Founding Editor-in-Chief of the *IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society*, and formerly EIC of the *IEEE Technology and Society Magazine*, editor at *Computers & Security*, and senior editor at *IEEE Consumer Electronics Magazine*.

Pranay Kotasthane chairs the Takshashila Institution's High-Tech Geopolitics Programme, and teaches public policy, international relations and public finance. He is a co-author of popular books on public policy like 'Missing in Action', 'When the Chips are Down' and 'We, the Citizens'. He is also a consultant with InKlude Labs.

Bharath Reddy is an Associate Fellow with the High-Tech Geopolitics Programme at the Takshashila Institution. His research interests are at the intersections of technology, geopolitics, and India's national interests, focusing on AI governance, open-source technologies, and telecommunications. He also manages the Graduate Certificate in Public Policy (Technology and Policy). Before joining Takshashila, he worked in telecommunications, developing software for 4G base stations.

Professor Greg Austin is a Director of the Social Cyber Institute. He has held appointments in the International Relations Department at ANU, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Department of War Studies Kings College London, and the University of New South Wales in Canberra. He is also currently an adjunct Professor at the University of Technology Sydney. Austin has worked on technology assessment for military and strategic purposes from social science perspectives, including private consultancies for the UK and Japanese governments. His perspectives on technology assessment have been outlined in his short report authored for IISS, 'Quantum Sensing: Comparing the United States and China' (2024). Austin was co-editor and contributing author for the IISS two-part series on 'Cyber Capabilities and National Power' (2021 and 2023). He has published two books on China's cyber power and co-authored several articles and reports on Russian cyber power.

Dr Brendan Walker-Munro is a Senior Lecturer (Law) with the Faculty of Business, Law & the Arts at Southern Cross University. Brendan's focus is on 'research security' – the use of law and policy to protect university research from national security threats such as espionage, foreign interference, hacking, and unauthorised technology transfer. He also researches other aspects at the intersection of national security law and higher education, such as research funding, privacy, and digital security. Brendan is appointed as an Expert Associate (Adjunct) at the National Security College at Australian National University, Canberra as well as a Member of the Queensland Councillor Conduct Tribunal, the Disciplinary Panel of CPA Australia, and a Senior Research Fellow of the Social Cyber Institute.

Lisa Materano is the Chief Executive Officer, Blended Learning International and a Director of the Social Cyber Group. Lisa Materano is a dynamic leader with extensive expertise in education, training, and strategic partnerships. As CEO of Blended Learning International (BLI) and Director of the Social Cyber Group (SCG), she drives innovative programmes in professional development, accredited education, and cyber-focused initiatives. Lisa has spearheaded projects with a global focus, including pathways development under the Australian Qualifications Framework (AQF) and international collaborations such as online course delivery in India and tailored presentations to Chinese delegations. Her leadership reflects a commitment to excellence and a vision for equipping professionals with future-ready skills. In this project, Lisa's strategic insight and passion for impactful education ensure alignment with industry needs and sustainable growth, leveraging her proven expertise in cross-cultural engagement and organisational development.

Adam P. Henry is a Senior Fellow in the Social Cyber Institute and a Partner in the Social Cyber Group. He is a policy and programme specialist in cyber security education, skills and workforce development. He has instigated key pilot programmes that are focused on growing and developing the required multifaceted multidisciplinary cyber skills within the economy. He was invited to participate as a subject matter expert in the 2017 Prime Minister's Cyber Taskforce, and has been invited to brief ministers, shadow ministers and government senior executives on these key topics to develop cyber strategies and initiatives. He has provided key research papers on cyberspace and has been fortunate to be invited globally to speak on these key topics. He has had a broad cyberspace professional career spanning the Australian Public Service, a major consulting firm, academia, working in multiple start ups, his own consulting business and industry accelerators and clusters. Adam is undertaking doctoral studies at the RMIT University where he also facilitates post graduate studies in cyber security, digital and AI.

