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This book from 2008 describes the contemporary state of planning and thinking within the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with respect to Network Centric Warfare (NCW) at that time, and discusses the vulnerabilities that accompany the use by Defence of the National Information Infrastructure (NII), as well as Defence’s responsibility for the protection of the NII.

This 2024 article examines what is needed to marry a cyber targeter’s talent to the goal of system penetration and profound disabling effects that can defeat an adversary's kinetic capabilities.

This 2023 survey of 10 countries shows how radically they have responded to the unprecedented cyber operations during the Russia-Ukraine war. The report also flags important lessons about the strategic character of cyber operations in modern war.

This IISS Research Report concludes that the United States enjoys a comfortable lead over China in quantum-sensing research and development, owing in large part to the much larger scale of US efforts, their relative quality, the longer institutional development of research and education capabilities, and the superiority of the US quantum-sensing industry.

This 2024 article examines what is needed to marry a cyber targeter’s talent to the goal of system penetration and profound disabling effects that can defeat an adversary's kinetic capabilities.

This 2025 paper seeks to strengthen consensus among key stakeholders in Australia and India regarding the importance of a joint technology assessment process.

The 2025 project aims to create a self-organising community of practice (CoP) inclusive of both countries, promoting its sustainability after the project's conclusion and potentially extending its influence on a wider multilateral scale.

All security outcomes in cyberspace are determined by individuals, whose behaviour is shaped by their social setting, whether organisational or cultural. Yet there has been little evidence globally of the necessary adjustment of policy or practice that gives due weight to the social science dimensions.

Australian policy response to the coronavirus outbreak has followed a two-step process, with containment the highest priority (the bio-medical and humanitarian view) and with economic and social consequences (a whole of society view) occupying a clear follow-on priority.

Cybersecurity attacks have become a growing focus for many businesses and governments. A challenge in responding is to determine the level and allocation of cyber-security budgets.

This 2023 paper reflects on a proposed system for benchmarking and evaluating cybersecurity strategies, assessing both the strategy's design and its implementation. In doing so, it critiques existing approaches as Australia emerges from what the government has described as a period of “cyber slumber.”

Australia's existing public and private capacity, despite the increased emphasis on the cyber domain, is likely insufficient to counter the full range of threats it faces in cyberspace.

Since 2022, Australia has significantly expanded its cyber and intelligence capabilities through major new investments. The scale of this expansion has prompted discussion of its geopolitical drivers and the implications for public and parliamentary oversight.

Australia’s 2025 cyber response plan introduces a “nationally catastrophic” incident category, but preparedness for such a crisis remains unclear. This paper argues that cyber civil preparedness and resilience must become central to national security policy.

In this 2016 paper, Greg Austin argues that Australia will need to develop complex responsive systems of decisionmaking for medium intensity war that address multi-vector, multi-front and multitheatre attacks in cyber space.

There should be a single overarching evaluation of the entire strategy (to ensure coherence between policy pillars) every four years as well as separate evaluations of each policy pillar, every two years.

This study undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the fiscal consequences of extreme cybersecurity incidents affecting publicly traded corporations in the 21st century.

Australia should harness the capability provided by civilians and develop volunteer cyber forces as part of a whole-of-society approach to national defence and cyber resilience. In addition to cybersecurity functions, volunteer cyber forces may be eYectively utilised in relation to Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), information and cognitive conflict, as well as espionage and proactive cyber activities.

n 2019 and 2020, sixteen Australian and international researchers looked closely at the subject of civil defence from the perspective of  cyber emergencies in Australia, Europe, Israel, Canada and the US.

“The single most important characteristic of Australian cyber diplomacy has been the contrast between the professionalism of the… officials… and their relative lack of enthusiasm for the full potential of the globalised information society.”